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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is the fourth annual survey of Supreme Court voting 
behavior presented in the BYU Journal of Public Law. 1 Like its prede-
cessors, it examines the positions taken by each member of the Court 
on selected categories of cases decided during the immediately preceding 
Term. The classification scheme is designed to provide indicators of the 
Justices' views on important dimensions of constitutional interpretation 
and individual rights. Nine of the categories are based on the nature of 
the issues or the character of the parties. A tenth category tabulates the 
number of times each Justice voted with the majority in cases decided 










Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or 
political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party. 
Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one 
of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private party. 
State criminal cases. 
Federal criminal cases. 
First amendment rights of speech, press, association, and the 
free exercise of religion. 
Equal protection claims. 
Statutory civil rights claims. 
Cases raising a challenge to the exercise of federal court ju-
risdiction, including standing, justiciability, and related 
matters. 
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(1989); Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. Pus. L. 15 (1988). 
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(9) Federalism issues. 
Tables 1-9 present voting data for these nine issue-related categories. 
Table 10 deals with the cases decided by a single vote. 
Each of the first nine categories is intended to reveal attitudes of 
the Justices toward two super issues which are relevant to most Su-
preme Court decision-making-individual rights and judicial restraint. 
Criminal prosecutions, as well as claims arising under the first amend-
ment, the equal protection clause, and the civil rights statutes, have 
obvious relevance to individual rights. Civil actions between govern-
mental and private parties are also likely to raise issues of individual 
rights because the preference for a governmental party usually is at the 
expense of persons claiming rights against the government. The same is 
true, perhaps to a lesser extent, of the federalism category. Decisions on 
such issues undoubtedly reflect the Court's view of the proper federal/ 
state balance; nevertheless, a vote for the state may also be a vote 
against a person seeking federal relief from alleged state encroachment 
upon his rights. 
Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to legisla-
tures as the policy-making branch of government, with respect for pre-
cedent, with avoidance of constitutional questions when narrower 
grounds for decision exist, with concern about standing and jus-
ticiability, and with respect for the framers' intent (when ascertainable) 
in construing constitutional text. 2 As a hands-off policy, judicial re-
straint favors the government rather than the individual who claims a 
right against the government, because the laws are already in place. 
Judicial restraint is also likely to be identified with respect for the role 
of states within the federal system. 
Judicial restraint and concern for individual rights are not neces-
sarily opposite poles of a single attitudinal dimension. Respect for pre-
cedent, avoidance of constitutional questions, a strict view of standing 
and justiciability, deference to states, and allegiance to the framers' in-
tent are not necessarily inconsistent with respect for individual rights. 
Still, judicial restraint is often at odds with claims of individual rights. 
Deference to legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's 
claim, especially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental 
action. Emphasis upon the framers' intent can mean unwillingness to 
read new individual rights into the Constitution. Reluctance to exercise 
federal court jurisdiction may leave the decision to state courts, with 
their possible bias in favor of actions by state governments, and the 
certain disappointment of the claimant seeking federal intervention. In 
2. For a discussion of judicial restraint, see Lamb, judicial Restraint on the Supreme Court, 
in SUPREME CoURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 7, 8 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. !982). 
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the voting tabulations that follow, most of the data supporting an infer-
ence of judicial restraint, or the lack of it, will also be consistent, re-
spectively, with a narrow or a broad view of individual rights. 
II. THE VOTING RECORD 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Govt Govt Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 26 11 70.3 66.7 67.9 71.8 
O'Connor 25 12 67.6 57.4 50.0 64.1 
Scalia 24 13 64.9 59.2 51.7 64.1 
Kennedy 22 14 61.1 57.1 50.0 
White 22 15 59.5 55.1 53.6 43.6 
Blackmun 16 21 43.2 30.6 44.8 36.8 
Stevens 15 22 40.5 35.4 37.9 46.2 
Brennan 10 27 27.0 20.4 34.5 33.3 
Marshall 10 27 27.0 21.3 34.5 30.8 
Majority 
All Cases 19 18 51.4 51.0 51.7 53.9 
Split Decisions 11 10 52.4 64.0 58.8 
Unanimous 8 8 50.0 37.5 41.7 
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TABLE 2 
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Govt Govt Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 22 6 78.6 71.4 61.8 90.6 
White 21 7 75.0 71.4 72.7 87.1 
Blackmun 18 10 64.3 60.7 50.0 53.1 
Kennedy 17 11 60.7 66.7 58.3 
O'Connor 17 11 60.7 60.7 76.5 75.0 
Scalia 17 11 60.7 59.3 62.5 82.8 
Stevens 16 12 57.1 42.9 55.9 50.0 
Brennan 15 13 53.6 37.0 45.5 43.8 
Marshall 14 14 50.0 39.3 44.1 46.9 
Majority 
All Cases 20 8 71.4 64.3 61.8 68.8 
Split Decisions 10 5 66.7 66.7 55.6 
Unanimous 10 3 76.9 61.5 68.8 
TABLE 3 
STATE CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Govt Govt Term Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 29 5 85.3 85.2 73.7 87.9 
O'Connor 26 8 76.5 77.8 61.1 75.8 
Kennedy 25 9 73.5 81.5 70.0 
Scalia 25 9 73.5 74.1 63.2 75.8 
White 25 9 73.5 77.8 47.4 81.8 
Blackmun 12 22 35.3 37.0 26.3 30.3 
Stevens 7 27 20.6 37.0 21.1 21.2 
Brennan 4 30 11.8 18.5 5.3 3.0 
Marshall 3 31 8.8 14.8 5.3 3.0 
Majority 
All Cases 22 12 64.7 70.4 47.4 60.6 
Split Decisions 21 9 70.0 72.7 53.8 
Unanimous 1 3 25.0 60.0 16.7 
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TABLE 4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Govt Govt Term Term Term Term 
O'Connor 7 2 77.8 77.8 71.4 90.0 
Rehnquist 7 2 77.8 88.9 85.7 80.0 
White 7 2 77.8 88.9 85.7 90.0 
Kennedy 6 3 66.7 88.9 71.4 
Scalia 6 3 66.7 66.7 64.3 70.0 
Blackmun 4 5 44.4 55.6 78.6 30.0 
Stevens 3 6 33.3 66.7 64.3 40.0 
Brennan 8 11.1 25.0 38.5 0.0 
Marshall 8 11.1 33.3 28.6 0.0 
Majority 
All Cases 6 3 66.7 88.9 78.6 60.0 
Split Decisions 5 1 83.3 100.0 75.0 
Unanimous 2 33.3 66.7 100.0 
TABLE 5 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, 
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term 
Brennan 11 4 73.3 81.3 84.6 91.7 
Marshall 11 4 73.3 76.5 84.6 91.7 
Blackmun 9 6 60.0 41.2 69.2 72.7 
Stevens 7 8 46.7 64.7 50.0 50.0 
Kennedy 6 9 40.0 37.5 66.7 
O'Connor 4 11 26.7 25.0 23.1 45.5 
Scalia 4 11 26.7 35.3 38.5 36.4 
White 3 12 20.0 23.5 30.8 41.7 
Rehnquist 2 13 13.3 18.8 16.7 16.7 
Majority 
All Cases 6 9 40.0 35.3 50.0 58.3 
Split Decisions 4 6 40.0 22.2 50.0 
Unanimous 2 3 40.0 50.0 50.0 
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TABLE 6 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/'o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term 
Kennedy 3 25.0 57.1 33.3 
O'Connor 3 25.0 66.7 12.5 42.9 
Scalia 3 25.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Rehnquist 4 20.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Blackmun 0 3 0.0 60.0 50.0 57.1 
Brennan 0 3 0.0 50.0 37.5 71.4 
Marshall 0 3 0.0 50.0 37.5 71.4 
Stevens 0 3 0.0 66.7 28.6 33.3 
White 0 5 0.0 66.7 12.5 28.6 
Majority 
All Cases 0 5 0.0 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Split Decisions 0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Unanimous 0 4 0.0 50.0 20.0 
TABLE 7 
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term o/'o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term 
Brennan 9 0 100.0 95.0 87.5 84.6 
Marshall 9 0 100.0 94.4 87.5 84.6 
Blackmun 8 1 88.9 80.0 87.5 84.6 
White 8 1 88.9 55.0 62.5 61.5 
Stevens 7 2 77.8 73.7 87.5 61.5 
Kennedy 5 3 62.5 45.0 66.7 
O'Connor 5 4 55.6 52.6 42.9 30.8 
Scalia 5 4 55.6 40.0 57.1 38.5 
Rehnquist 4 5 44.4 35.0 37.5 38.5 
Majority 
All Cases 8 88.9 50.0 75.0 53.9 
Split Decisions 5 1 83.3 25.0 60.0 
Unanimous 3 0 100.0 87.5 100.0 
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TABLE 8 
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term % Votes for Jurisdiction 
For Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction Term Term Term Term 
Brennan 21 3 87.5 66.7 62.8 60.7 
Marshall 21 3 87.5 75.0 57.1 57.1 
Blackmun 19 5 79.2 64.9 58.1 64.3 
Stevens 17 8 68.0 73.0 57.1 71.4 
O'Connor 17 8 68.0 51.4 42.9 64.3 
White 17 8 68.0 62.2 51.2 71.4 
Kennedy 16 9 64.0 51.4 56.3 
Rehnquist 15 10 60.0 51.4 47.6 67.9 
Scalia 15 10 60.0 50.0 36.6 61.5 
Majority 
All Cases 16 9 64.0 62.2 55.8 60.7 
Split Decisions 3 6 33.3 62.5 71.4 
Unanimous 13 3 81.3 61.9 48.3 
TABLE 9 
FEDERALISM CASES 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term % Votes for State Claim 
For State For Federal 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Claim Claim Term Term Term Term 
O'Connor 9 7 56.3 73.7 33.3 
Rehnquist 9 7 56.3 81.0 46.2 
Scalia 9 7 56.3 76.2 30.8 
Kennedy 8 8 50.0 72.7 33.3 
Blackmun 7 9 43.8 40.9 46.2 
Stevens 7 9 43.8 57.1 46.2 
White 7 9 43.8 63.6 30.8 
Brennan 6 10 37.5 31.8 53.8 
Marshall 6 10 37.5 33.3 53.8 
Majority 
All Cases 7 9 43.8 59.1 38.5 
Split Decisions 1 3 25.0 50.0 33.3 
Unanimous 6 6 50.0 70.0 42.9 
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TABLE 10 
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN 
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES 
Justice Number of Votes-1989 Term 
% Votes with Majority 
With Against 1989 1988 1987 1986 
Majority Majority Term Term Term Term 
White 33 9 78.6 76.5 77.4 
Kennedy 30 12 71.4 82.4 71.4 
O'Connor 29 13 69.0 76.5 64.5 
Rehnquist 28 14 66.7 76.5 70.0 
Scalia· 28 14 66.7 73.5 66.7 
Stevens 18 24 42.9 26.5 61.3 
Brennan 15 27 35.7 26.5 40.0 
Marshall 15 27 35.7 23.5 38.7 
Blackmun 14 28 33.3 38.2 45.2 
Conservative 
Coalition 27 15 64.3 76.5 64.5 
Liberal 
Coalition 15 27 35.7 23.5 35.5 
III. ANALYSIS 
A list of cases included in each of the ten tables, and criteria gov-
erning their selection, are presented in the appendix. Each case was 
read and classified by three readers-the two authors and a research 
assistant-and differences were discussed in order to achieve consensus 
on the appropriate classification. The result undoubtedly falls short of 
perfect validity and reliability, but we believe that other readers using 
the same coding criteria would arrive at substantially the same results. 
Still, some difficult problems of judgment remain. One example is 
Sullivan v. Stroop3 in which the Court was asked to construe a provi-
sion of the Social Security Act directing the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to disregard the first fifty dollars of "child 
support" in determining the child's eligibility for certain benefits. As 
interpreted by the Department, the "disregard" provision applied to a 
non-custodial parent's child support payments but not to insurance 
benefits received by the child under the Social Security Act. Five Jus-
tices approved the HHS interpretation and explicitly held that treating 
the two kinds of payments differently did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause. Four Justices in dissent insisted that the HHS interpreta-
3. 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990). 
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tion of the statute was irrational and wrong but did not specifically 
refer to the equal protection issue. Since equal protection at a minimum 
requires a "rational basis" for governmental action, the dissent could be 
viewed as impliedly saying that equal protection had been denied. On 
the other hand, the dissent's argument against the HHS position pre-
sumably would have been stronger if constitutional as well as statutory 
objections had been made explicit, and the constitutional argument was 
not explicit. Although reasonable minds could differ, we decided that 
the dissent did not raise a constitutional objection and we recorded the 
case in Table 6 as five votes against the equal protection claim and four 
Justices expressing no opinion. Most of the cases fit with little distor-
tion into a dichotomous classification of "for" or "against," but a few, 
like Stroop, leave room for legitimate differences of opinion on how a 
particular Justice's "vote" should be coded. 4 
The classification scheme permits a case to be included in more 
than one table, although the first four tables represent categories which 
are, for the most part, mutually exclusive. That is, a case is unlikely to 
be included in more than one of the other four categories. By definition, 
a case would not be categorized as both civil and criminal,11 nor would a 
case on appeal involve a simultaneous federal and state prosecution. 
However, a civil suit having a private party on one side and both a 
state and a federal agency or official on the other is possible. One case 
of that nature was decided during the 1989 Term6 and was included in 
4. Another difficult classification problem was presented in American Trucking Ass'ns v. 
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990), a case considering the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions. All 
nine Justices agreed that the petitioner Associations were entitled to a refund of at least part of an 
Arkansas highway use tax paid under a law found to be in violation of the commerce clause. To 
that extent, all nine took a position against the state party. Five Justices, however, made a further 
holding-more favorable to the state-that the state need not refund any part of the tax collected 
for the period preceding the Court's earlier decision in American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 
U.S. 266 (1987), which had declared unapportioned flat highway use taxes levied by states to be 
unconstitutional. The Smith case presented three possible options for inclusion in Table 1: (a) a 
nine-to-zero decision against the state, (b) a five-to-four decision in the state's favor, or (c) two 
decisions-one for and one against the state. We ultimately decided on the third option as the most 
accurate representation of the decision. In doing so, we followed the rule stated in Appendix A-3 
that a case is included more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues 
affecting the outcome of the case and if the issues are resolved by differing voting alignments. 
5. In Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), citizens challenged the 
constitutionality of a Michigan law authorizing the state police to set up sobriety check points on 
state highways. Because the challenge came in the form of a suit for injunctive and declaratory 
relief, and not as a defense to prosecution, the case was classified as a civil suit, even though the 
statute was in aid of drunk driving laws enforceable by criminal penalties. 
6. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990). A state (Vermont) and 
a federal agency were named respondents. Two additional cases, United States Dep't of Labor v. 
Triplett and Comm. on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 
(1990), created a somewhat analogous situation. Although listed in the appendix as separate cases, 
the Supreme Court dealt with them in a single opinion. The state and federal parties shared 
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both Tables 1 and 2. 
Tables S-1 0 do not in any way comprise mutually exclusive cate-
gories. A case raising more than one relevant issue is included in each 
relevant table. For example, an action by a private party against a state 
might raise issues pertaining to the first amendment, to equal protec-
tion, and to jurisdiction. If so, it would be included in all three issue 
tables, as well as in Table 1 (civil cases: state v. private party). The 
voting alignment would not necessarily be the same for each issue.7 In 
several instances, a single case was included more than once in the 
same category. This occurred when the facts raised two or more distinct 
issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues were decided 
by differing voting alignments.8 
A brief look at the behavior of the Court as a whole may be help-
ful before turning to voting by individual Justices within each of the 
ten categories. In particular, the data can provide a basis for appraising 
the extent of the Court's shift toward greater conservatism in recent 
Terms, a subject of continuing public interest. As the decisions are ana-
lyzed in our tables, a conservative position would ordinarily be inferred 
from a vote favoring the government, a vote against a claim of constitu-
tional or statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction, and 
a vote in favor of state (rather than federal) authority on federalism 
questions. 
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Some decisions 
were unanimous, indicating that the law or the facts of the case, or 
both, pointed so clearly one way that there was little room for play of 
liberal or conservative ideologies. In other cases, much fewer in num-
ber, the peculiar nature of the facts created a reverse of the expected 
relationship with liberals opposing a civil-rights claim and conserva-
tives supporting the claim. A good illustration is Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC,9 in which a broadcasting company brought action to chal-
common interests, and the same private party was respondent in each case. 
7. To illustrate, in Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), involving judicially man-
dated taxation to implement a school desegregation decree, the Supreme Court was unanimous on 
a jurisdictional issue but divided five to four on the extent of the district court's remedial powers 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
8. For example, FW /PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990), raised two separate 
first amendment questions: (1) whether the first amendment right of association was violated by 
the city's requirement that motels renting rooms for less than ten hours be licensed under an 
ordinance regulating "sexually oriented businesses," and (2) whether the city's licensing scheme 
for businesses purveying sexually explicit speech violated the first amendment for lack of adequate 
procedural safeguards. The Court gave a unanimous "no" to the first question and a six-to-three 
"yes" to the second. The case is tabulated twice in Table 1, as well as twice in Table 5, because 
the majority voted against the government on one first amendment issue and for the government 
on the other. 
9. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
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lenge the FCC's policy of giving preference to minorities and women in 
awarding broadcasting licenses. The petitioner alleged that the govern-
ment's race and gender preference violated the equal protection compo-
nent of the fifth amendment due process clause, a reverse discrimina-
tion claim. In this situation, the four most liberal members of the 
Court-Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens-joined 
by Justice White, voted against the equal protection claim, while the 
four most conservative members of the Court voted for the petitioner's 
equal protection claim. Despite such exceptional cases, the expected 
general correlation between ideology and voting is apparent in most of 
the tables. 
The voting of individual Justices can usefully be compared for any 
given year, but detecting a shift in the orientation of the Court or its 
members requires a comparison over time. For our analysis, the best 
available baseline is the comparable data generated for the three prior 
years. In the tables, this information is presented as percentages for 
each Justice and for the Court majority. One must use caution in inter-
preting the data because the percentages are affected not only by the 
behavior of individual Justices but also by the nature of the cases de-
cided in a given year. A vote to uphold a higher percentage of criminal 
convictions in a given year may indicate that a Justice or the Court has 
become tougher on criminal defendants. Alternatively, it may mean 
only that this year the facts or the law (or both) of the decided cases 
were less favorable to the defendant than in previous years. Such varia-
tions in law and fact undoubtedly affect other categories of cases. 
Hence, one cannot be confident that percentage changes in a table from 
one year to the next reflect a change in ideological orientation of an 
individual Justice or of the Court majority. Similar directional changes 
across a number of tables, however, would strengthen the hypothesis 
that a genuine shift in attitude has occurred. This is true because varia-
tion in the nature of the cases should be random and thus is unlikely to 
account for a pronounced directional change in several tables.10 
For the 1988 Term, reported a year ago, the data showed a signif-
icant directional change for the Court as a whole toward greater con-
servatism, as compared with the two immediately preceding years. 11 
This year, at least statistically, the conservative movement on the Court 
lost ground. Change over time in the decisions of the Court is indicated 
I 0. There is, of course, the possibility that a change in the priorities or attitudes of members 
of the Court could introduce some hidden bias into the process by which cases are selected for 
review, resulting in the selection of cases in which the government's (or the individual's) position is 
particularly strong. We know of no way to identify the existence, or explain the impact, of such a 
variable, however. 
II. See Riggs & Urban, supra note I, at 11-13. 
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by the percentage figures in the bottom three rows of each table, which 
show how the majority of the Court voted. The first of the three rows 
gives figures on all cases included in the table. The second row is lim-
ited to decisions with one or more dissenting votes, while figures in the 
bottom row are calculated only from cases with no dissent. For all cases 
(row one), a more conservative result appears in Tables 2 and 6 (fed-
eral civil cases, equal protection) when compared with the 1988 Term. 
No significant change is shown in Tables 1, 3, 5, and 8 (state civil 
cases, state criminal cases, first amendment issues, jurisdictional is-
sues).12 In Tables 4, 7, and 9 (federal criminal cases, statutory civil 
rights, federalism issues), the shift runs in a more liberal direction. 
In some respects, a better measure is found in the second row from 
the bottom, which includes only decisions in which a dissenting vote 
was cast. Excluding decisions taken without dissent13 has the disadvan-
tages of a smaller universe of cases, but the advantage of including only 
those cases in which ideological differences might have affected the out-
come. When split decisions alone are counted, the movement toward a 
less conservative position is even more evident. Tables 1, 4, 5, 7, and 9 
point in a more liberal direction; Tables 2 and 3 show no significant 
change; and only Table 8 (jurisdiction) suggests movement in the con-
servative direction. On its face, Table 6 (equal protection) appears to 
indicate a more conservative result for 1989 than 1988, and the figures 
are in that respect totally misleading. Only one equal protection issue 
was resolved by a split decision during the 1989 Term. 14 Although the 
decision went against the claim, a nominally conservative outcome, in 
fact the vote had the liberal result of upholding the FCC preference for 
minority applicants and was opposed by the four most conservative 
members of the Court, as noted above. With that interpretation, Table 
6 also points in a more liberal direction, although a single case is a very 
weak basis for generalization. 111 
The swing-vote table (Table 1 0) further confirms the shift to a 
12. "Significant change" as used here does not refer to statistical significance, a measurement 
that in this context would at best lend spurious precision to the analysis, but rather to a rule-of-
thumb judgment that any change of five percentage points or less is probably not very significant, 
as that term is used in common parlance. 
13. This refers mainly to unanimous decisions but includes a few in which one or more 
Justices did not participate or did not address the issue. 
14. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
15. The conservative retreat in 1989 makes the Court's record, statistically, only slightly 
more conservative than the 1987 Term. Comparing all cases for those two Terms, and excluding 
the deceptive equal protection tabulation, four tables (Tables 2, 3, 5, 9) point in a more conserva-
tive direction for 1989, three in a more liberal direction (Tables 4, 7, 8), and one shows no 
significant change (Table 1). For split decisions only, five tables (Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 8) show more 
conservative voting in 1989, and three show more liberal (Tables 1, 7, 9). 
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less conservative position. In cases decided by a single vote during the 
1988 Term, the majority agreement scores for the four liberal members 
of the Court (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens) range from a 
low of 23.5% (Marshall) to a high of 38.2% (Blackmun); by contrast, 
the five more conservative Justices voted with the majority in a range of 
73.5% to 82.4%. During the most recent (1989) Term, the liberals 
scored in a somewhat higher range, 33.3% (Blackmun) to 42.9% (Ste-
vens), and the conservatives scored lower, 66.7% (O'Connor, Rehn-
quist, Scalia) to 78.6% (White). Moreover, Justice White, who scored 
the highest in 1989-90, achieved that eminence by voting in eight close 
cases with a liberal coalition, in addition to twenty-five votes with a 
conservative majority. 
The same contrast appears in a comparison of the majority coali-
tions (rather than individual behavior) in cases decided by a five-to-four 
vote during the two Terms. In 1988, the conservative coalition domi-
nated in twenty-six of thirty-four votes, or 76.5% of close cases. In 
1989, the conservative position prevailed in twenty-seven of forty-two 
decisions, or 64.3%.16 Looking at the liberal end of the scale, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall together voted with the majority in just eight of 
thirty-four (23.5%) close cases during the 1988 Term, compared with 
fifteen of forty-two (34.1 o/o) in 1989. A modest recession from the 1988 
conservative high water mark is thus evident in these figures as well as 
in Tables 1-9_17 
We turn now to a more detailed examination of individual voting 
behavior. 
A. Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party 
Table 1 lists summary percentages and the number of times each 
Justice voted for and against the state government in a civil dispute 
with a private litigant. Table 2 gives the same kind of data for civil 
disputes between the federal government and private parties. The rank-
ings are generally as expected, with conservative Justices at the top 
16. One case, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990), was decided by an unusual 
majority consisting of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia. The issue was 
admissibility of evidence against a criminal defendant who had not received a Miranda warning. 
Although three of the five Justices in the majority are generally conservative, Justices Brennan 
and Marshall are the most consistently liberal voters. Given this odd coalition, the five-to-four 
portion of the Court's decision was classified as "liberal" because it went in favor of the defendant. 
17. The conservative scores were somewhat higher and the liberal scores lower than the 1987 
Term when the conservatives prevailed in just over half the close cases, 17 of 31 (54.8%). To 
recapitulate, conservative dominance was 65.9%, 73.5%, and 54.8% for the 1989, 1988, and 1987 
Terms, respectively. The Brennan-Marshall majority voting percentages for the same Terms were 
34.1%, 20.6'?"o, and 38.7%. 
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(pro-government) of the scale and liberal Justices at the bottom. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist occupies his customary spot at the top of both lists, 
and Justices Brennan and Marshall, as usual, are at the bottom. Jus-
tice White also holds his customary position in the middle of the state 
government table (but closer to the conservative than the liberal pole in 
percentage support of government) and near the top of the federal gov-
ernment table. Justice Blackmun again scores relatively high in support 
of the federal government ( 64.3%, ranked third) but much lower 
(43.2%, ranked fifth) for state government. Justice Kennedy, the newest 
member of the Court, is still clearly conservative but nevertheless near 
the middle in both rankings. As compared with the preceding Term, 
every member of the Court registered higher percentage support of both 
state and federal governments, except Justice Kennedy (60.7%, 66.7%) 
and Justice O'Connor (60.7o/o both Terms) in the federal government 
table. This individual voting translated into a somewhat higher per-
centage of Court decisions favoring the federal government (71.4% to 
64.3%) but no significant change in majority support of state govern-
ment (51.4%, 51.0%). Justice Brennan showed the biggest individual 
change on either table, rising nearly seventeen percentage points on the 
federal table. This changed his ranking only from ninth to eighth, how-
ever, 3.6 percentage points above Justice Marshall. The greatest varia-
tions in the federal table all occurred at the bottom of the list-Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens all substantially increased their sup-
port of the federal government. As in past years, the federal govern-
ment prevailed in a larger percentage of its cases than did the states. 
Examination of the state cases in which Justices at the extremes 
voted contrary to their anticipated pro- or anti-government leanings 
shows that the discrepancy is largely accounted for by the unanimous 
decisions, in which, we assume, the case on one side or the other was 
strong enough to transcend ideological differences. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, at the top of the scale, voted only three times against the state 
when l:he Court was divided. One such case was Board of Education of 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens/ 8 in which the Court, with 
only a single dissent (Stevens), rejected an establishment clause chal-
lenge to a federal statute requiring high schools to grant student reli-
gious groups access to high school facilities on an equal basis with other 
extracurricular student groups. A second case, Kansas v. Utilicorp 
United, Inc., 19 held that the two states had no standing to sue on behalf 
of their citizens for illegal overcharges by pipeline and gas producers. 
Voting on the issue was almost a straight liberal-conservative split, but 
18. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). 
19. 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990). 
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not in the expected direction. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and White supported the government cause, and Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, Scalia, and Stevens joined the Chief Justice in opposing 
standing. In the third case, Pennsylvania Department of Public Wel-
fare v. Davenport,20 the Chief Justice voted with six other members of 
the Court (] ustices Blackmun and O'Connor dissenting) to hold that 
restitution obligations imposed for welfare fraud are, under federal 
statute, debts dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
At the bottom of the scale in Table 1, Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall voted only twice for the government in a divided vote. The two 
cases were Utilicorp, noted above, and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce.21 Austin, like Utilicorp, was decided by a primarily liberal 
majority (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, White, and Rehn-
quist), and it upheld a Michigan regulation of political campaign 
spending by corporations. In both cases, the government was attempt-
ing to control the activities of large corporations, which may account for 
liberal support of the government cause. If so, the liberal voting record 
of Justices Brennan and Marshall was perfect for the Term in this 
category. 
In Table 2, civil cases involving a federal government party, sev-
eral of the unexpected votes occurred in unanimous decisions. This ac-
counts for three of Chief Justice Rehnquist's six votes against the gov-
ernment as well as three of Justice White's seven anti-government 
votes. The other three Rehnquist votes against the government occurred 
in United States v. Energy Resources Co.,22 a tax case decided by an 
eight-to-one majority (Blackmun dissenting), and in two ideologically-
charged five-to-four decisions, Spallone v. United States23 and Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,2" where a vote against the government was 
in fact the conservative position. The conservative five-to-four majority 
in Spallone reversed contempt sanctions against individual Yonkers 
City Council Members for refusing to vote in favor of a court-ordered 
housing desegregation decree. In Metro Broadcasting, the Chief Justice 
joined three fellow conservatives in dissenting from a decision uphold-
ing policies of minority and gender preference in awarding broadcast-
ing licenses. Justice White voted with the Chief Justice in the tax case 
Energy Resources Group, Inc. and Spallone. He also voted against the 
government in two other cases having no obvious ideological 
20. 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990). 
21. !lOS. Ct.!391 (1990). 
22. 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990). 
23. 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990). 
24. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
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significance.:~1111 
At the bottom of the scale, Justice Marshall voted for the govern-
ment four times and Justice Brennan five times when the Court was 
divided. Both supported the government position in Spallone (housing 
desegregation), Metro Broadcasting (minority preference), Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp. (reinstatement of pension fund), and NLRB v. 
Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. (pro-union decision),26 which, in each 
case, meant an outcome favoring the "underdog," worker or union in-
terests. Justice Brennan's fifth vote supported government refusal to 
disclose documents sought by a defense contractor in connection with a 
grand jury investigation of his suspected fraudulent conduct. 27 Appar-
ently the defense contractor did not fit the underdog mold well enough 
to enlist Justice Brennan as his champion. 
B. Criminal Cases 
The two criminal case tables (Tables 3 and 4), as in previous 
Terms, reflect the same ideological divisions as the civil case tables, 
and, as usual, the voting is somewhat more polarized, particularly in 
the state table. Of the thirty-four state-court decisions brought for re-
view, Justice Marshall voted only three times for the prosecution and 
Justice Brennan but four times. At the conservative end of the spec-
trum, Chief Justice Rehnquist sided with the defendant on just five 
occasions. More than in any other table, the Court tends to divide into 
"lenient" and "law and order" blocs in dealing with state criminal 
questions. The four liberals ranged from 8.8% (Marshall) to 35.3% 
(Blackmun) support of the prosecution, while the conservatives scored 
73.5o/o (Kennedy, Scalia, White) to 85.3% (Rehnquist). A 38.2 percent-
age-point gap separates the least lenient liberal from the most lenient 
conservative, and fourteen of the twenty-seven five-to-four decisions 
supported by a conservative majority (see Table 10) dealt with state 
criminal cases. 
Individual departures from the anticipated vote by Justices at the 
extremes of the scale are readily explicable. Of the five cases in which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist voted for the defendant, three were decided 
25. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990) (Justices O'Connor, 
Stevens, and White dissenting), and Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 
2759 (1990) (Justices Rehnquist and Stevens dissenting). In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the 
Court upheld a PBGC order requiring LTV to "restore" a pension plan earlier terminated when 
LTV went through corporate reorganization. The Maislin decision found an Interstate Commerce 
Commission policy to be in violation of federal statute. 
26. 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990). 
27. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S. Ct. 471 (1989). 
1] SUPREME COURT VOTING 17 
without dissent.28 Another was an eight-to-one decision in which Jus-
tice Marshall objected only to disposing of the case summarily,29 and 
the fifth case presented a question of Indian tribal-court jurisdiction 
over a non-member Indian who committed a crime within the tribal 
territory.30 In opposing tribal-court jurisdiction, the Chief Justice 
(joined by six others) was essentially casting his vote against Indian 
tribal rights-substantively a conservative position-rather than against 
"state government" in the ordinary sense. 31 Justice Marshall, at the 
bottom of the scale, voted for government only twice in a divided 
court-once to support Indian tribal jurisdiction in Duro v. Reina82 
and once merely to register his objection to summary disposition of the 
case.33 His vote in Duro, and that of Justice Brennan, were votes for 
tribal rights rather than for state government. Justice Brennan sup-
ported the prosecution in two other split-decision cases. One, Illinois v. 
Perkins,34 decided that an undercover officer posing as a fellow jail in-
mate need not give a Miranda warning before eliciting information 
from a suspect. The other, Pennsylvania v. Muniz., 811 held admissible 
defendant's responses to several "booking" questions he had answered 
prior to his receiving a Miranda warning. 88 The only dissent in each 
case was cast by Justice Marshall. 87 For other members of the Court, 
somewhat less committed to either the defense or the prosecution than 
their brethren at the extremes, percentages and rankings remained very 
stable in comparison with the preceding Term. 
Table 4 (federal criminal cases) includes fewer decisions than the 
state table. As in the previous Term, it exhibits a more regular progres-
sion in the rankings from very frequent to very infrequent support for 
the prosecution. The government's success rate also continues to be 
higher in federal than in state criminal cases by a slight margin ( 66.7% 
28. Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (faulty instructions); Florida v. Wells, 110 S. 
Ct. 1632 ( 1990) (lack of police policy for inventory search); and Selvage v. Collins, 110 S. Ct. 97 4 
(1990) (remanded to determine impact of intervening Supreme Court decision). 
29. Smith v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990). 
30. Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990). 
31. This case raised a problem of classification. Indian tribal government is "local," but is 
also national in its direct subjection to congressional control. We concluded that it was more analo-
gous to state than national government, which accounts for its inclusion in Table 3 rather than in 
Table 4. 
32. 110 S. Ct. 2053 ( 1990). 
33. Smith v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990). 
34. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990). 
35. 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). 
36. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). 
37. Marshall's dissent was presumably based on the belief that the fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination is important enough to nullify the government's interest in undercover 
investigation and expeditious booking of suspects. 
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to 64.7%) when all decisions, unanimous and non-unanimous are in-
cluded, but by a substantial margin (83.3% to 70%) for the split deci-
sions. During the 1988 Term, the federal government lost only one 
criminal case and that in a divided court. This Term the federal gov-
ernment lost three of nine cases, two by unanimous votes38 and one (the 
flag-burning case) by a five-to-four decision. 39 Justices Brennan and 
Marshall voted for the prosecution only once, joining a unanimous 
Court in upholding a federal statute providing for a Crime Victim's 
Fund.40 Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice, at the other extreme, 
espoused the defendant's cause only twice, both in unanimous deci-
sions.41 This Term Justice Kennedy dropped a rank or two in both 
state and federal criminal tables, and Justice O'Connor moved closer to 
the top of the pro-prosecution rankings. 
C. Individual Rights 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 deal with claims of constitutional and statutory 
rights. Table 5 (first amendment claims) and Table 7 (statutory civil 
rights claims) show the same broad voting patterns as Tables 1 through 
4 (government versus private party claims). Although the rankings 
vary, Justices Brennan and Marshall are at the liberal extreme in both 
scales. Chief Justice Rehnquist is at the other extreme, accompanied by 
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, and by Justice White in the first amend-
ment table. Justice Kennedy, while closer to the conservatives in his 
percentage support of such claims, is near the center of the rankings in 
both tables. Justice White is the one anomaly-among the least sup-
portive of first amendment claims but highly supportive of statutory 
civil rights claims. 
Table 6 (equal protection) shows virtually nothing that might be 
expected-the conservatives rank higher than the liberals, and the lib-
eral Justices show no support at all for equal protection claims. This 
strange alignment probably reflects changes occurring over the past two 
decades in the legal position of women and minorities. Laws discrimi-
38. Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990); Hughey v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 
1979 (1990). 
39. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). 
40. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990). The criminal defendant, who 
was required to contribute to the fund, unsuccessfully argued that the statute violated the origina-
tion clause of the Constitution (art. I, § 7, cl. 1) because it was a "revenue" measure that had 
originated in the Senate rather than the House. 
41. Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990) (remanded to determine if the offenses 
charged constituted burglary, so as to merit an enhanced sentence); Hughey v. United States, 110 
S. Ct. 1979 (1 990) (The court can order restitution, under the applicable statute, only for the 
crime for which defendant was convicted, not for other alleged crimes). 
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nating on the basis of race and gender are subject to heightened scru-
tiny under the equal protection clause of the Constitution which has 
been an important refuge for these legally disadvantaged groups. Such 
discriminatory laws are now virtually a thing of the past. When gov-
ernmental officials now engage in discriminatory acts, they are very 
likely to be in violation of some state or federal statute that protects 
women and minorities. As a result, equal protection claims are now 
most often raised in areas where government action requires only a 
rational basis for its justification, and equal protection issues are often 
peripheral to the case. This Term, in particular, equal protection 
claims were raised in only five cases, and in three of them several Jus-
tices found no need to express an opinion on the issue. 42 
Equal protection issues still occasionally appear in a context of 
race and gender discrimination, but now the shoe is on the other foot. 
Laws, facially at least, are more likely to discriminate in favor of 
women and racial minorities than against them. The most controversial 
equal protection claims are now being brought by individuals and 
groups claiming reverse discrimination, i.e., injury resulting from gov-
ernment favoritism to minorities.43 In such cases, the customary divi-
sions on the Court for or against individual rights are reversed: the 
conservatives support the claimed right and the liberals oppose it. All of 
these trends help explain Table 6. The only claim of equal protection 
resolved by a split vote during the 1989 Term was Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCc,•• challenging the FCC's minority preference policy. 
The case was decided by a five-to-four vote on a straight liberal-
conservative division-conservatives for the claim, liberals against, and 
Justice White providing the swing vote in favor of the minority prefer-
ence. The one other equal protection claim to merit the attention of all 
nine members of the Court, all of whom rejected it, was Sperry Corpo-
ration's argument that assessing a user fee against successful, but not 
unsuccessful, claimants before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
was constitutionally unequal treatment. 46 The equal protection argu-
ment was secondary to other (also unsuccessful) constitutional argu-
ments (due process, takings clause), and the Court had no difficulty 
42. Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990) Uustices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens not addressing the issue); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 
(1990) Uustices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia not addressing the issue); United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens 
not addressing the issue). 
43. E.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
44. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
45. United States v. Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387 (1989). 
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finding a rational basis for the government's action. 
Table 5 (first amendment claims) follows the anticipated voting 
pattern. The fit is even closer when cases without dissent are elimi-
nated. In the split decisions, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to 
uphold the first amendment claim in every instance but one. The one 
exception was Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce"6 in which a 
business organization sought first amendment protection against a 
Michigan statute regulating political campaign spending by large cor-
porations. The law was upheld by a six-to-three vote with three con-
servative Justices (Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia) unsuccessfully cham-
pioning the first amendment claim. When first amendment rights of 
business corporations are at issue, the solicitude of some liberal and 
conservative Justices for first amendment values apparently is reversed. 
The Chief Justice, however, remained consistently negative, rejecting 
every first amendment claim decided by a non-unanimous vote. Justice 
Blackmun rebounded from his low score of the previous Term and once 
again supported most first amendment claims. Justice Stevens returned 
to his former pattern of less aggressive support, and Justice Kennedy 
maintained his position of the past two Terms at the middle of the 
rankings. 
Table 7 (statutory civil rights) generally falls within the antici-
pated pattern, except that Justice White supported the rights-claimant 
more often than expected. In the past three Terms, his support has 
been near sixty percent; this Term it approached ninety percent. Ma-
jority support for statutory rights claims was also considerably higher 
this Term. Justices Brennan and Marshall, at the top of the table, 
voted for the claimant in every instance. The Chief Justice, at the bot-
tom of the scale, voted four times for the claimant and five times 
against. Three of his four favorable votes were unanimous decisions;"7 
the fourth was an eight-to-one decision in the Mergens case"8 which 
upheld a federal statute giving student religious groups access to high 
school facilities on terms equal to other extracurricular groups. Justices 
between the extremes are ranked at fairly regular intervals. 
D. jurisdiction and justiciability Questions 
Table 8 (jurisdiction claims) again conforms in general outline to 
our initial assumptions about judicial restraint-the liberal Justices ap-
pearing more inclined to exercise jurisdiction and the conservative Jus-
46. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). 
47. Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 110 S. 
Ct. 577 (1990); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990). 
48. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). 
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tices less so. Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and White occupy the mid-
range of the table with Justices Brennan and Marshall most receptive 
to the exercise of jurisdiction and Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice 
the least. For the most part, this is comparable to the pattern of the 
past two Terms, although differing significantly from the 1986 Term 
when voting on jurisdiction appeared unusually affected by judicial 
concern for substantive outcomes. 49 The number of jurisdiction and jus-
ticiability questions is quite large every Term, but often the issue is not 
controversial enough to draw a single dissent. As shown by the figures 
on the second row from the bottom of Table 8, the issue was disputed 
in only nine of twenty-five decisions. The rankings in Table 8 are 
about as expected, although the percentage differences among the Jus-
tices are small. The percentage differences are amplified only when the 
non-unanimous decisions are tabulated, as follows: 
justice For jurisdiction Against %For 
Brennan 8 0 100 
Marshall 8 0 100 
Blackmun 6 2 75 
O'Connor 4 5 44.4 
Stevens 4 5 44.4 
White 4 5 44.4 
Kennedy 3 6 33.3 
Rehnquist 2 7 22.2 
Scalia 2 7 22.2 
These numbers show a total spread of 78 percentage points (compared 
with 27.5 percentages points in Table 8), and a gap of more than thirty 
percentage points emerges between Justice Blackmun and Justices 
O'Connor, Stevens, and White. At the extremes, Justices Brennan and 
Marshall had a perfect record in support of jurisdiction, while Justice 
Scalia and the Chief Justice supported jurisdiction in only two of the 
nine decisions-both decided by an eight-to-one vote. Justice Stevens 
was the lone dissenter in each case.110 If judicial restraint is identified 
with reluctance to exercise jurisdiction, it is also identified-in recent 
Terms at least-with ideological conservatives on the Court. Con-
versely, activism, as measured by willingness to exercise jurisdiction in 
49. At least this seemed the most likely explanation for the aberrant voting pattern during 
the 1986 Term. See Riggs, supra note I, at 15, 25-26. 
50. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990); Northbrook Nat'! Ins. Co. v. 
Brewer, 110 S. Ct. 297 (1989). 
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a disputed case, characterizes the liberal members of the Court. 
E. Federalism Issues 
Table 9 (federalism issues) deals with questions raised by conflict 
between federal and state governmental authority. Federalism, for pur-
poses of this category, includes such matters as preemption, intergov-
ernmental taxation, application of the tenth and eleventh amendments, 
and federal court interference with state court activities (other than re-
view of state court decisions). Table 9 does not include cases in which 
the only conflict is alleged incompatibility of the state action with the 
United States Constitution. Nor does it include issues of "horizontal" 
(interstate) federalism arising under the dormant commerce clause or 
the privileges and immunities clause in response to state-erected barri-
ers to interstate commerce. 
In examining issues of federalism, we assume that the more con-
servative Justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-are 
likely to favor state authority, while Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackni.un will support federal authority. For the 1987 Term, reported 
two years ago,111 the results were largely the reverse of what we ex-
pected: Justices Brennan and Marshall appeared most supportive of 
states; Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens were in the middle; 
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White, and Scalia were least sup-
portive. We explained this anomaly by reference to the relatively few 
split decisions (six of thirteen in the table) and the specific subject mat-
ter of the disputes which led the liberals to support the state position 
more frequently than the conservatives.112 This explanation, in retro-
spect, is still plausible. For the 1988 Term, no such explanation was 
necessary because the judicial ranking on the federalism issue fell 
cleanly into the anticipated pattern. The same is true for the 1989 
Term, despite the very small number of split decisions (four). Percent-
ages for the three most recent Terms are presented in Table 9. 
F. Swing-Vote Analysis 
Table 10 shows the number of times each Justice voted with the 
majority in cases close enough to be decided by a single vote. For the 
1989 Term, we identified forty-one decisions made by a five-to-four 
vote.113 In these cases, a shift of any one Justice from the majority to the 
51. See Riggs & Moss, supra note 1, at 59, 65, 75-76. 
52. /d. at 75-77. 
53. This is the usual "close case." During the 1987 Term, however, when the Court con-
sisted of only eight members before Justice Kennedy's confirmation, we included in the swing-vote 
category 14 cases decided five-to-four, 14 decided five-to-three, and 3 decided four-to-three. Seven 
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minority coalition would have created a new majority and a different 
result. We call this "swing-vote" analysis because it identifies members 
of the Court who most frequently shift or "swing" from one voting 
coalition to another in order to form majorities. Because each vote is 
crucial to the outcome, frequency of voting with the majority in such 
cases may be regarded as one index of influence on Court decision-
making. 
The archetypical swing voter on the Court is a person not 
staunchly committed to a liberal or a conservative position who votes 
sometimes with one group and sometimes with the other, making the 
crucial difference in close cases. Justice White has to some extent filled 
this role in recent years, as did Justice Powell before his retirement.'14 
During the 1987 Term, the first year we included swing voting in this 
survey, Justice White voted most frequently with the majority in cases 
decided by a single vote. 1111 During the 1988 Term, Justice Kennedy 
had that honor. 118 This Term Justice White regained his position at the 
top of the rankings by voting with the majority in thirty-three of forty-
two decisions. Justice Kennedy ranked second with thirty majority 
votes, Justice O'Connor was third with twenty-nine, and the Chief 
Justice and Justice Scalia followed with twenty-eight each. The four 
more liberal members of the Court-Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun-voted with the majority 18, 15, 15, and 14 times, respec-
tively. As in the preceding Term, this configuration suggests conserva-
tive dominance on the Court, although not to the same extent. The 
bottom row in Table 10 gives the number and percentage of decisions 
dominated by a conservative coalition during the 1989 Term, and the 
percentage of such decisions for the 1988 and 1987 Terms. 117 The con-
servative majority percentages for the 1987, 1988, and 1989 Terms are 
64.5%, 76.5%, and 64.3%, respectively.118 These figures, like those in 
the preceding tables, show a modest retreat from the peak of conserva-
additional five-to-three decisions were not included because they were affirmances rather than 
reversals of a lower court decision. With five-to-three affirmances, the shift of one vote would not 
change the outcome because the case would be affirmed without opinion by a four-to-four vote. 
54. See, e.g., Bender, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REv. 635 (1984) (reviewing V. BLASI, 
THE BuRGER CouRT (1983)); Fallon, A Tribute to justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 399 (1987). 
55. See Riggs & Moss, supra note I, at 77-78. 
56. Riggs & Urban, supra note I, at 8, 21. 
57. In most instances, the composition of the prevailing majority and the substantive outcome 
of the decision were consistent and left no doubt whether the conservatives or liberals had won. In 
a very few cases, an unusual coalition made classification difficult. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 110 
S. Ct. 3139 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). 
58. Percentages are derived from 20 of 31 decisions in 1987, 26 of 34 in 1988, and 27 of 41 
in 1989. 
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tive influence during the 1988 Term. 
Statistically, the change is explained by an increase in genuine 
swing voting by Justices White and Kennedy. During the 1988 Term, 
Justice White voted just four times with a liberal coalition in thirty-
four close cases-twice on the winning side and twice on the losing 
side. This year he voted with the liberal side in ten of forty-two cases, 
providing the winning vote in eight of them. Justice Kennedy also voted 
with five winning (and two losing) liberal majorities this year, as com-
pared with two (and zero) last year.l19 Voting straight conservative was 
still good enough to score high in the swing-vote table during the 1989 
Term but not as high as in the previous Term. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the relationships 
appearing in patterns of Supreme Court voting without exhausting all 
credible interpretations of the data. The availability of information for 
earlier Terms gives an important temporal dimension to the analysis. 
In last year's report on the 1988 Term, the tables indicated a signifi-
cant shift in a conservative direction as compared with the two previous 
Terms. Data for 1988 also showed the voting to be more polarized than 
before with a greater point spread between the extremes of the tables. 
This year the polarization declined, along with a slight moderation in 
conservative dominance. We had not anticipated the conservative de-
cline, modest as it was, because the composition of the Court was the 
same this Term as last. Random factors may account for the difference, 
but given the known propensities of members of the Court, we would 
have predicted outcomes closer to last year's pattern. For next year, the 
resignation of Justice Brennan could make a significant difference in 
the behavior of the Court, especially if Justice Souter demonstrates the 
judicial and ideological conservatism that most observers expect. 
59. Chief Justice Rehnquist voted once with a liberal majority (NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 
Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990)); Justice O'Connor twice (Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 
3139 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990)); and Justice Scalia three times 
(Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990); United 
States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990)). Justices Brennan and Marshall never voted with a 
conservative majority in a five-to-four decision. 
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V. APPENDIX 
A. Explanation of Criteria for Selection and Classification of Cases 
1. The universe of cases 
Only cases decided during the 1989 Term by a full opinion setting 
forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Decisions on 
motions are excluded, even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases han-
dled by summary disposition are included if accompanied by a full 
opinion for the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases 
decided by a four-to-four vote, hence resulting in affirmance without 
written opinion, are excluded. Both signed and per curiam opinions are 
considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than per-
functory manner. Cases not fitting any of the ten categories are, of 
course, not included in the data base for any of the tables. 
2. Cases classified as civil or criminal 
Classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly ac-
cepted definitions; generally, the nature of the case is clearly identified 
in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a problem of classifi-
cation. One case that raised a question this year was Michigan Depart-
ment of State Police v. Sitz,60 discussed above at note five. 
3. Cases classified by nature of the parties 
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental 
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true 
of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded if they do not satisfy this 
criterion. The governmental entity might be the government itself, one 
of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one of 
its political subdivisions. A suit against an official in her personal ca-
pacity is included if she is represented by government attorneys or if 
the interests of the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In in-
stances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental enti-
ties appear on both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a fed-
eral entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with only 
private parties on the other, the case is included in both Tables 1 and 
2. A case is included more than once in the same table if it raises two 
or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues 
are resolved by differing voting alignments. 
60. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
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4. Classification by nature of the issue 
A case is included in each category (Tables 5 through 9) for which 
it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the written opinion(s). One 
case may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is also included 
more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues 
in that category affecting the disposition of the case and if the issues are 
resolved by differing voting alignments. A case is not included for any 
issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, is not addressed in 
any opmwn. 
Identification of first amendment and equal protection issues poses 
no special problem. In each instance, the nature of the claim is ex-
pressly identified in the opinion. Issues of speech, press, association, 
and free exercise of religion are included. Establishment clause cases 
are excluded, however, because one party's claim of religious establish-
ment is often arrayed against another party's claim of free exercise or 
some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individual rights. 
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are limited 
to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the civil rights statutes ap-
pearing in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 1988; and other federal statutes ex-
pressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national ori-
gin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based on 
a federal statute or if the issue is the application of section 1983-that 
is, whether or how that section's protections apply in the case at hand. 
However, section 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right as-
serted is based on the United States Constitution and the issue relates 
to the constitutional right. The purpose of the section 1983 exclusion is 
to preserve a distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
claims. 
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not 
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions are 
excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of the 
Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may comment on 
its jurisdiction. 
Table 9 (federalism cases) is limited to issues raised by conflicting 
actions of federal and state or local governments. Common examples 
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the tenth 
and eleventh amendments as a limit on action by the federal govern-
ment, and federal court interference with state court activities (other 
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism 
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or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant com-
merce clause or the privileges and immunities clause, are excluded from 
the table. 
5. The "swing-vote" cases 
Table 10 includes all cases decided by a single vote. This year all 
such cases were decided by a five-to-four vote. The category also is 
intended to include four-to-three decisions, as well as five-to-three and 
four-to-two decisions resulting in reversal of a lower court decision. Af-
firmances by a vote of five-to-three or four-to-two are not included be-
cause a shift of one vote from the majority to the minority position 
would still result in affirmance, by a tie vote, and the outcome would 
not be changed. A case is included more than once in the table if it 
raises two or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case 
and the issues are resolved by differing five-to-four (four-to-three, etc.) 
voting alignments. No case from the swing-vote category was included 
more than once this Term. 
B. Cases Included in Statistical Tables61 
Table 1: Civil Cases: State/Local Government versus Private Party 
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990). 
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202 (1990). 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). 
Baltimore City Dep't of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990). 
Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). 
Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990). 
California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990). 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990). 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). 
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989). 
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989). 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). 
Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990). 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990). 
Kansas v. Utilicorp United, 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990). 
Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990). 
Lewis v. Continental Bank, 110 S. Ct. 1249 (1990). 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990). 
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
National Mines Corp. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3205 (1990). 
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990). 
61. Cases listed more than once in a table are those with more than one voting alignment 
within the category. 
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Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990). 
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990). 
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990). 
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990). 
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990). 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990). 
United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1 990). 
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). 
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990). 
Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government versus Private Party 
Begier v. I.R.S., 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990). 
Comm'r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990). 
Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990). 
Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997 (1990). 
Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990). 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990). 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990). 
General Motors Corp. v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2528 (1990). 
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S. Ct. 471 (1989). 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990). 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990). 
Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990). 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990). 
Portland Golf Club v. Comm'r, 110 S. Ct. 2780 (1990). 
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 914 ( 1990). 
Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1 990). 
Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 110 S. Ct. 2658 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 (1990). 
United States v. Energy Resources Co., 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990). 
United States v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 110 S. Ct. 462 (1989). 
United States v. Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387 (1 989). 
United States v. Dalm, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). 
United States Dep't of Labor v. Tirplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990). 
University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990). 
Table 3: State Criminal Cases 
Alabama v. White, 1 10 S. Ct. 2412 (1990). 
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990). 
Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990). 
Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990). 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990). 
Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990). 
Delo v. Stokes, 110 S. Ct. 1880 (1990). 
Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223 (1990). 
Duro v. Reina, 1 10 S. Ct. 2053 (1 990). 
Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1 990). 
Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). 
Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1 990). 
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Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). 
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). 
Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990). 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990). 
James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990). 
Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990). 
Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990). 
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). 
McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990). 
Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990). 
Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990). 
New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990). 
Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990). 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). 
Saffle v. Parks, II 0 S. Ct. 1257 (1990). 
Sawyer v. Smith, II 0 S. Ct. 2822 (1990). 
Selvage v. Collins, 110 S. Ct. 974 (1990). 
Smith v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990). 
Terrell v. Morris, 110 S. Ct. 4 (1989). 
Walton v. Arizona, II 0 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990). 
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases 
Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990). 
Hughey v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1979 (1990). 
Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990). 
United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). 
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). 
United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 110 S. Ct. 2072 (1990). 
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990). 
United States v. Rios, 110 S. Ct. 1845 (1990). 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). 
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Table 5: Cases Raising a Challenge to First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, 
and Free Exercise 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). 
Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990). 
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990). 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990). 
Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990). 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). 
Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990). 
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990). 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990). 
United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). 
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). 
University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990). 
30 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 
Table 6: Cases Involving Equal Protection Claims 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990). 
United States v. Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387 (1989). 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). 
Table 7: Cases Involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims 
[Volume 5 
Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). 
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989). 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989). 
Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990). 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990). 
University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990). 
Yellow Freight Sys., Corp. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990). 
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S. Ct. 1384 (1990). 
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers lnt'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 110 S. Ct. 424 (1989). 
Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990). 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990). 
FW /PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989). 
Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990). 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990). 
Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990). 
Lewis v. Continental Bank, 110 S. Ct. 1249 (1990). 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990). 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990). 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 110 S. Ct. 297 (1989). 
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990). 
Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 110 S. Ct. 2658 (1990). 
Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990). 
United States v. Dalm, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). 
United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990). 
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990). 
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990). 
Table 9: Cases Raising a Federalism Issue 
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S. Ct. 1384 (1990). 
California v. F.E.R.C., 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990). 
English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990). 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990). 
Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990). 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990). 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1986 (1990). 
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Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990). 
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990). 
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990). 
Tafnin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990). 
United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990). 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990). 
Table 10: Swing-Vote Cases 
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990). 
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990). 
Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990). 
Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990). 
Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990). 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990). 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
Delo v. Stokes, 110 S. Ct. 1880 ( 1990). 
Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223 (1990). 
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). 
Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). 
Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990). 
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). 
James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990). 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990). 
Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990). 
Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990). 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990). 
Missouri v. Jenkins, Ito S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990). 
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990). 
North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1986 (1990). 
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990). 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990). 
Rutan v .. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990). 
Saffle v. farks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990). 
Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 ( 1990). 
Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Everhart, 110 S. Ct. 960 (1990). 
Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990). 
Terrell v. Morris, 110 S. Ct. 4 (1989). 
United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). 
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). 
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). 
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990). 
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990). 
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